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Arusha Peace Agreement Rwanda Pdf

At the end of November 1993, the peace agreement and ceasefire found itself at a very delicate level when a massacre in Ruhengeri Prefecture brought the RPF and the government into conflict, refusing both to participate in the joint commission on military integration and to block demobilization efforts (document 19 and document 20). The document also describes the deadlock during the political part of the negotiations, in part because of disagreements over whether to leave the political party CDR (Coalition for the Defense of the Republic) in the transitional government, and also clarifies the RPF`s alliances with other parties. Participants decided to pause political discussions and discuss power-sharing and military integration. The Arusha agreements provided for the formation of a large-scale transitional government (BBTG), [2], which would include the insurgent RPF and the five political parties that, since April 1992, have formed a transitional government in the run-up to parliamentary elections. The agreements contained other elements deemed necessary for a lasting peace: the rule of law, the repatriation of refugees from both fighting, power-sharing agreements and the merger of government and rebel armies. The agreement also worried many soldiers who feared a general demobilization as a result of the army merger regime under the agreement. This is a factor that helps explain the genocide that followed the following year. [7] The RPF and Rwandan government representatives met in Arusha, Tanzania, to conduct negotiations to develop the “Arusha Agreements”. U.S. observers (among observers from five other countries) in Arusha point out to the Secretary of State that there may be a delay in negotiations due to differences over the reports of violence in the integration of the militias of the two groups. According to the report, “there have been some concerns that any delay would aggravate the unrest of troops on the ground and jeopardize the ceasefire.” It also calls into question the commitment of all parties to the implementation of peace agreements. It notes that the intentions of the other parties are generally suspicious, which could pose problems for the integration of the armed forces. She writes: “Although the leaders of both sides have signed the peace agreement, neither side trusts the intentions of the other side.

Historical rivalries between the Hutu majorities that dominate within the country and the minority Tutsis, who dominate within the RPF, continue to fuel antagonism. On the one hand, doubts remain as to whether the RPF is committed to democracy or to the seizure of power and the restoration of Tutsi rule. On the other hand, doubts remain about the commitment of the President and his close entourage to share the governance of the country with the RPF. Mental and emotional adjustments will not be easy. Ambassador Flaten writes that any mention of demobilization leads to an upsurge in violence on the streets of Rwanda.